Set intersection is a building block for many data analysis techniques, e.g. in data mining. Private set intersection enables to compute the set intersection without revealing the non-matching items. The advent of cloud computing drives the desire to outsource such computations, but without the need to trust the service provider. Homomorphic encryption enables secure, outsourced computations, but in case of multiple clients cannot prevent collusion.
INTRODUCTION
Consider two parties -Alice and Bob -each have a set of database tuples. They want to compute the intersection of their respective sets. This is a common operation in data analysis, e.g. in order to compute association rules [32] or database joins [16] .
We assume that Alice and Bob have additional privacy requirements. Particularly, neither Alice nor Bob want to reveal anything about their tuples not in the intersection. This operation is called private set intersection and has been extensively considered in the literature [1, 8, 9, 11, 15, 23, 24, 25, 26] .
Private set intersection can in turn be used to implement privacy-preserving data analysis [33] , but it also has applications by itself. Consider the no-fly list of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The DHS has an interest in not revealing the members of this list and for privacy reasons it would be beneficial to not reveal passengers not contained in the list. The airlines and the DHS could achieve this using private set intersection.
Cloud computing offers new opportunities for collaborative applications. One clear advantage of a service provider hosting the data is that the parties can collaborate without all of them being on-line at the same time. Nevertheless, cloud computing brings along with it new security challenges. The service provider is entrusted with all data and may use it for other purposes than intended. Furthermore, the service provider may become a high-profile target and its data loss affects all its clients.
It is therefore beneficial to implement outsourced applications without relying on the trustworthiness of the service provider. Homomorphic encryption [18] enables the computation on encrypted data. A client submits its data encrypted and receives the result of the computation also encrypted.
Nevertheless, in order to perform the computation all ciphertexts need to be encrypted under the same key. This implies that the clients need to share the same public-/private key-pair. In fact, in [12] it has been proven that it is impossible to construct a fully homomorphic encryption scheme with different keys. This sharing of the key enables a collusion attack with the service provider. The service provider shares the encrypted input of one party with another party which may then decrypt it.
In this paper we present collusion-resistant, outsourced computation of the private set intersection. Alice and Bob -or in general any client -submit their encrypted input to the service provider. The service provider then facilitates the computation of the set intersection. Later, Alice or Bob, can retrieve the intersection at their discretion.
In the case of the no-fly-list our encrypted computation would allow any untrusted third party, e.g. a foreign government, to host the list. The airlines can then submit their -also encrypted -inputs and retrieve the intersection. Any interaction would only take place between the third party and the airline. This paper contributes two protocols for this outsourced setting. First, we present a protocol where the cloud service provider learns the intersection. Second, we present a protocol where the service provider learns nothing -including the intersection's size.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review the security notions of joint computations and motivate our choice. Then in Section 3 we present our protocols and their analysis. We give an overview of related work in Section 5 and conclude the paper in Section 6.
SECURITY NOTIONS

Semi-Honest Security
Semi-honest or honest-but-curious security [19] is a model for secure computations. Secure computations [34] are a generic technique to compute without revealing one's input. A secure computation is a protocol for multiple parties each with their own private input. In semi-honest security, each party follows the protocol, but keeps a record of all received messages. A party may later try to infer additional information from this record.
Loosely speaking, semi-honest security ensures confidentiality (of the input), when integrity is not attacked. Note that confidentiality is limited to information that cannot be inferred from one's input and output. Semi-honest can be proven by giving a simulator of the messages received from one party's input and output. If the output of this simulator is indistinguishable from a real protocol execution, then the protocol is secure in the semi-honest model. Security in the semi-honest model may be sufficient, if deviations from the protocol prevent obtaining the correct result. If the parties have an interest in the result, then they are not inclined to attack.
Malicious Security
Malicious security [19] extends semi-honest security to arbitrary behavior of the parties. In malicious security the protocol may abort, if any party deviates. Loosely speaking, malicious security ensures both, confidentiality and integrity, of the computation. Note that integrity of the computation does not include a party providing correct input.
Goldreich presented a compiler for protocols secure in the semi-honest model into protocols secure in the malicious model [19] . Nevertheless, the malicious model requires verification of the computation which so far is as complex as performing the computation itself. Verifiable computation [7, 17] may help to shift this effort to a pre-computation phase. Nevertheless, this performance penalty contradicts the use of outsourcing, as in cloud computing. We therefore do not employ this security model. Instead, we use the security model of public-key encryption described next.
Public-Key Encryption
In public-key encryption an adversary tries to infer information given ciphertexts and the public key. Loosely speaking, encryption ensures confidentiality, no matter how the adversary behaves, i.e. when there is no integrity. We distinguish deterministic and randomized encryption. In randomized encryption [20] a plaintext maps to many ciphertexts. The corresponding security models of ciphertext indistinguishability are very strong: Anything that can be computed given the ciphertexts can be computed without them. Even given the public key and the ability to perform a chosen plaintext attack, the adversary should not be able to determine whether two ciphertexts have the same plaintext.
In deterministic encryption a plaintext always maps to the same ciphertext. Then, the abilities of the adversary depend on the information about the plaintexts [2] . An adversary can always perform a brute-force guessing attack: he makes a guess, encrypts it and compares the ciphertexts. The adversary is therefore always able to determine whether two ciphertexts have the same plaintext.
In outsourced, private set intersection on encrypted inputs we can at best hope for security against deterministic encryption. If a client transmits its ciphertexts, a collusion of another client and service provider can simulate set intersection with any input. They can therefore perform any type of guessing attack as in deterministic encryption which rules out ciphertext indistinguishability (under chosen plaintext attack). In this paper we therefore consider security equivalent to deterministic encryption.
OUTSOURCED PRIVATE SET INTERSEC-TION
We now describe our outsourced private set intersection protocol in detail. We consider only two clients -Alice and Bob -although our protocols readily extend to more than two clients. We call the service provider Serena.
The protocol is divided into four algorithms and subprotocols. We describe each functionality.
Setup: Alice, Bob and Serena are each issued their key material. This includes any public parameters. This step must be performed only once. Subsequent steps can be then performed multiple times. It can be either executed as a secure computation protocol or by a trusted dealer who distributes the results.
Submit: Each client -Alice or Bob -encrypts their input and submits it to Serena. This step can be performed noninteractively.
Compute: Once Serena has received all (encrypted) inputs she performs the computation of the set intersection. Depending on the security objectives, she may learn the intersection or not. This step is also performed non-interactively.
Retrieve: After Serena has computed the set intersection, the clients -Alice or Bob -can each retrieve the intersection. Depending on the security objectives, this may be interactive or non-interactive.
Security Definition
Following the security of encryption (see Section 2.3) we define a game for security. Our security objective is confidentiality of the input (except what can be inferred from the output) under arbitrary behavior and collusion. First, we consider the security of Alice's input. She interacts with an adversary A unifying the roles of Bob and Serena. Our game proceeds as follows:
1. Alice executes the Setup algorithm and hands the keys for Bob and Serena to the adversary.
2. Alice simulates the Submit algorithm and sends her (encrypted) input to the adversary.
3. Alice simulates the Retrieve algorithm with the adversary, but discards any output 1 .
4. The adversary is asked to output a guessx of Alice's input x.
The security of Bob's input is interchangeable, since he performs the same operations as Alice. Serena has no input and therefore a collusion between Alice and Bob can reveal no new information. Consequently, this game captures the entire security objectives for the input of our protocol. We define additional security objectives for Serena and the output in the following subsections.
We compare this game to a deterministic one-way function, e.g. a public-key encryption scheme. Let S be the simulated messages of Alice during the game. Then, let there be an adversary A ′ for the one-way function which is given information (public key) pk and the function (ciphertext) c (of x). We call the advantage AdvA of the adversary the difference between a successful guess of adversaries A and A ′ . We call our outsourced private set intersection secure, if this advantage is negligible in the security parameter λ.
We call our protocol secure, if
Public Output
We first consider the case where Serena is supposed to learn the intersection. This can be useful, if she uses this intersection in subsequent computations.
Let m be the bit length of the encoding of the domain of x. We use a keyed hash functions H() : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} l+m . We describe each step of the protocol. Alice has input x = x1, . . . , xv and Bob has input y = y1, . . . , yw.
Setup: Choose key K for the hash function H and distribute it to Alice and Bob.
Submit: We denote the bit-wise "exclusive-or" operation as ⊕. Alice submits x ′ = H(x1), . . . , H(xv). Bob submits y ′ = y1 ⊕ H(y1), . . . , yw ⊕ H(yw).
Compute: Serena computes the v × w cross-product
For each x ′ i ⊕ y ′ j she interprets the first l bits and if they are all 0s, then she adds the next m bits as z to the intersection.
Retrieve: Alice and Bob retrieve the intersection in plaintext from Serena.
1 Integrity of the computation is not our security objective
Correctness
If xi = yj, then H(xi) = H(yj). We denote {x} r s the substring of x from bit position r (inclusive) to bit position s (exclusive). Therefore, Serena will add z = {H(xi) ⊕ (yj ⊕ H(yj))} l l+m = yj to the intersection. If xi = yj, then the probability P r[{H(xi) ⊕ H(yj) = 0}
−l of adding a false element is negligible.
Performance
The round complexity is
Security Proof
We first state the security of our one-way function H under the random oracle assumption.
Theorem 2. Let H be a random oracle and let there be at most q oracle queries. Then, given H(x) the probability of correctly outputting the image x is at most
The proof is simple and omitted. Note, that the random oracle can adaptively change its output for any future query.
We next give an algorithm B that given an adversary A with AdvA in our outsourced private set intersection produces a pre-image with probability also AdvA. This algorithm B proceeds as follows:
Setup: Let H be modeled as a random oracle. The algorithm B is given H(x) and access to the oracle. The adversary A is given access via B, i.e. it must submit its queries to B. If B receives a query, it forwards it to the oracle and returns the result.
Submit: The algorithm B submits H(x) as its input. Retrieve: The algorithm B retrieves (and discards) the set intersection.
Guess: The adversary A outputs its guessx of B's input. The algorithm B outputsx as its guess of x. Corollary 3. Let H be a random oracle and let there be at most q oracle queries. Then, the advantage AdvA of an adversary A in our outsourced private set intersection is at most 0.
We can also give a simulator in semi-honest security for the view of Serena. She obtains her output (the set intersection) and otherwise uniformly distributed, random numbers from the oracle. Note that Serena does not have oracle access.
Oblivious Service Provider
We now consider the case where Serena is supposed to learn nothing -not even the size of the intersection. This setup enables the highest level of security in outsourcing: Alice or Bob can upload their (encrypted) sets to Serena and the other party can query whenever necessary.
Again, Alice has input x = x1, . . . , xv and Bob has input y = y1, . . . , yw. In this case we use RSA encryption [30] with a modulus of k bits. The protocol proceeds as follows.
Setup: Alice and Bob jointly choose an RSA modulus n = pq, such that neither knows its factorization. Let φ() be Euler's totient function. They can do so using this specialized protocol [4, 13] or any generic secure computation. Furthermore -using this secure protocol -they generate the following exponents: d1, d2, e, and f . The exponents are generated, such that (d1 + d2)e = f (mod φ(n)) These exponents are distributed as follows: Serena obtains e; Alice obtains d1 and f ; Bob obtains d2 and f .
Submit: Alice submits
w (mod n). Compute: Serena computes the v × w cross-product
Alice and Serena engage in a regular, private set intersection protocol, e.g. [9] , with the sets x ′′ and z, respectively. For each element in the intersection x ′′ ∩ z, Alice adds the respective element from x to the result set. Bob performs the corresponding operations using his set y.
Correctness
Therefore, Alice and Bob will retrieve z in the private set intersection protocol and add xi and yj , respectively, to the result set. If xi = yj, then the probability P r[z ∈ x ′′ ] = 2 −k of adding a false element is negligible.
Performance
The round complexity is 2. Up to retrieval the computation is non-interactive, i.e. Alice and Bob submit their inputs to Serena which performs the computation. The private set intersection protocol of [9] requires one round of interaction. The communication complexity is O(v + w) elements by Alice and Bob of size k bits during submission. The communication complexity during retrieval is O(vw) in the private set intersection protocol. The computation complexity during computation is also quadratic O(vw). Note that this complexity is optimal, since any pair that Serena does not have to consider for the intersection, reveals to her (some) information about the intersection's size.
Security Proof
The security of RSA is captured in the following assumption.
Assumption 4. Given a ciphertext c = xẽ (mod n) and the exponentẽ, it is hard to compute the plaintext x. Let k be the security parameter, then for any polynomial poly(k) it holds that
We next give an algorithm B that given an adversary A with AdvA in our outsourced private set intersection produces a plaintext to an RSA challenge with probability also AdvA. This algorithm B proceeds as follows:
Setup: The algorithm B is given an RSA challenge of c and e. It chooses random numbers d2 and e and then computes f as
The algorithm B is cautious to not cause any wrap-around in the modulus φ(n). In the worst case, it can choose d2 = 0 and e = 1.
Submit: The algorithm B submits c as its input.
Retrieve: The algorithm B simulates a private set intersection protocol with an arbitrarily chosen element. Note that Serena will learn no new information about x ′′ due to the privacy of the protocol (except the already known set size). Furthermore, the algorithm B does not need to obtain the resulting intersection for its simulation Guess: The adversary A outputs its guessx of B's input. The algorithm B outputsx as its guess of x.
Theorem 5. If the RSA assumption holds, then the advantage AdvA of an adversary A in our outsourced private set intersection is at most 0.
IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS
We implemented the Submit and Compute phases of each of the two protocols. The implementation highlights -in addition to the difference in complexity -the difference in the constants of the performance. The protocols with public output use cryptographic hashing which is a very lightweight operation compared to modular exponentiation of the protocols with an oblivious service provider.
We implemented both protocols in Java 6. We 10 experiments for set sizes from 100 to 1000 with step size 100. For each experiment we made 20 test runs. The experiments were performed on a multi-CPU, multi-core Intel Xeon 2.4 GHz machine, but only one core was used for running the experiments. The total available memory was 64 GB, but the experiments were performed as a single process with 256MB heap size. The operating system was Linux with kernel version 2.6.16.
Figure 1: Performance Results of Implementation
The performance results of our implementation are depicted in Figure 1 . The y-axis is logarithmic and shows an order of magnitude difference between the different operations. The fastest operation is the computation of the intersection with public output. It operates in less than a millisecond even for sets with 1000 items. It involves no cryptographic operations, just additions and lookups into a hash ations with an oblivious service provider are more expensive due to the modular exponentiations. Submission is on the order of a few hundred milliseconds while computation exceeds 100.000 milliseconds. Furthermore oblivious computation has quadratic complexity, compared to the linear complexity of all other operations, such that it will become the bottleneck for larger set sizes. We show the detailed averages in milliseconds including the 95% confidence interval in Table 1 . As a conclusion we argue that on the one hand for performance critical operations, e.g. on very large sets or on resource-constrained devices, public output is the protocol of choice. It is orders of magnitude faster than its oblivious counterpart. On the other hand, for security sensitive operations, e.g. in the area of homeland security, where partial leakage in the form of public output is not acceptable, the oblivious protocol is the only choice. We can show that it already has acceptable performance for moderately sized, practical applications.
RELATED WORK
There exists a large number of two-party private set intersection protocols. We group them by their basic technique.
Using oblivious polynomial evaluation [27] one can evaluate a polynomial without disclosing the coefficients. The idea is to represent the set elements as the roots of the polynomial and then obliviously evaluate it on the other party's set elements. Several protocols [15, 26, 8, 24] use this technique.
Using oblivious pseudo-random functions [14] the client can evaluate a keyed, pseudo-random function on its input where the server holds the key. The idea is to compute the intersection on the pseudo-random functions of the set elements. The client obtains the result of the pseudo-random function obliviously. [23] and [25] use this technique.
Using blind signatures [6] a client can obtain a signature on its input without disclosing it. The idea is to present (aggregate) signatures of the elements of a set, hash the result of the verification and compute the intersection on the hashes. These techniques are used by [1, 9, 11] .
Private set intersection in the outsourced model has not been considered so far. Homomorphic encryption [18] offers secure outsourcing and efficient variants of homomorphic encryption, e.g. [28] , can be used for oblivious polynomial evaluation [27] . Outsourced oblivious polynomial evaluation requires more powerful homomorphic encryption, such as [5] . Furthermore, homomorphic encryption does not provide collusion resistance against the private key holder in the multi-client setting. That such an encryption system cannot exist, has been proven in [12] .
In other areas of computer science alternatives to homomorphic encryption have been evaluated. Outsourced databases have been extensively considered before [22] . The basic idea is to encrypt the data on the server and then query it. One avenue of research is enabling additional functionality preferably without violating security objectives. In [21] SQL queries have been enabled on encrypted, outsourced databases. The contents of the query can be secured using private set intersection [10] . All of these technique are limited to one client using the outsourced database. The problem of collusion resistance addressed in this papers does not yet arise in this setting.
In [29] multiple clients are introduced, but collusion resistance is limited to one of two cloud service providers and a client. If both service providers collude, then there are no security guarantees.
Querying encrypted data can also be realized using searchable encryption [31, 3] . But, as in homomorphic encryption, there is no collusion resistance against the private key holder. Efficiently searchable encryption also requires deterministic encryption [2] .
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have investigated collusion-resistant protocols for outsourced private set intersection. We have presented two protocols with different service provider security requirements. The novelty of our protocols lies in collusionresistance in the encryption model, such that security is preserved if one client and the service provider collude. Such a security guarantee cannot be achieved by encryption techniques, such as homomorphic or searchable encryption. Secure outsourcing -as for our set intersection -enables the use of untrusted cloud infrastructures to perform the computation.
The performance results indicate that for practical applications the public output protocol where the cloud service provider learns the intersection is preferable, since it is an order of magnitude faster. Nevertheless for securitysensitive applications the oblivious service provider protocol where the service provider remains completely oblivious to the computation is already practical for medium problem sizes.
